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BASIS OF APPEAI LATE JURISDICTION
This is a appeal from the Memorandum Decision, handed down
from the Third Judical District Court, Honorable Scott Daniels,
and is a final Judgment to dismiss said complaint April 29, 1983
and jurisdiction

is conferred

though Title ?8-2a-3, Utah Code of

Law, as a means to ascertain the correctness of the Memorandum
Dec i si on,
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal bv Plaintiff from the "Memorandum
Decision" in which the Trail Court granted

"Good Faith" to the

Idaho Decree, and a judgment of $150.C»0 in favor of Defendant,
and against Plaintiff,
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
A.

Whether or not a fair application of existing Utah

law, to the facts of this case required a dismissal of the case,
and the granting of "Good Faith" to the Idaho Decree, when the
face of the Idaho Decree pointed to the fact that both parties
were in fact Utah Citizens, and that the Defendant-Respondant
left the matrimonial domicile in Utah, and went to Idaho for the
sole purpose of securing a divorce by fraud on the court.
B,

Whether or not the "Memorandum Decision" upholds the

Plaint iff-Appeallants' rights and protection that is granted to
him, though the Utah Constitution, from unlawful!/ prosecution,
and if it is lawfully for a Utah Citizen to file suit against
another Utah Citizen in

any foreign smypathic forum, rather than
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the proper forum» as is the case here,
C.

Whether or not a fair application of existing Utah law

to the facts of this case required a dismissal of the case,
without giving the Plaint iff-Appeallant the RIGHT OF DISCOVERY,
ar\d then to base the reason for dismissal of said case, on
",,,Mo compelling evidence in this case.,.", March 18, I9SS this
decision was made two davs after the serving oi

"Plaintiffs'

First Request for the production of documents", March 16, 1933,
on the Defendant, nine days after the Defendants' appearance*
D.

Wheter or not Peter W, Guyon is in fact the Attorney

for the Defendant-Respondant or

if he is in fact representing a

unknown third party, due to his confessed lack of knowledge of
the whereabouts of the Defendant, March 19, 1988, and the Court
Order, Februarv 12, 1988. finding the Defendant had ran away and
disappeared, and now the Defendant in and though h#r

Idaho

Attorney, filing suit against the Plaintiff suing for issues
that Peter W, Guyon has been fighting agaisnt in Utah,
E.

Whether or not Peter W. Guyon could even represent the

Defendant-Respondant, bei ng the PIai nt i ff-Appea11 ants' fami 1y
attorney, and at this moment is the representing the Plaintiffs'
father in Court, and as the family attorney, he has access to
psychological reports, homestudies, and other sensitive
information acquired on the Plaintiff while a minor child,
giving him a clear psvcholoqical edge over the
PIai n i ff-Appeal 1 ant ,

F.

Whether or not a -fair hearing was given to the

Plaint if f -Appeal lant, due to the misrepresentations of Peter W.
Guyon, attorney of the Defendanat-Respondant to the Trail Court,
these misrepresentation 'were listed in the "Memorandum of
Plaintiff ir\ opposition to Defendants' Motion for sanctions
under Rule 11", April 13,

1988, that over twenty days has lasped

and no refutation or evidence to the contrary has been made by
Peter W. Gu-'on, these misrepresentation has been to such a
magnitude so 9ts to confuse and pollute this case.
G,

Whether the Trail Court accurately upheld existing

Utah Law, as to the denial of four counts of Rule 11 sanctions,
against the Defendant-Respondant for submitting motions, in
which each issue was already before ethe court, the court neversaid that these motions contained "good faith argruements" or
"were warranted by existing law", but yet denied Rule 11
sanctions, when each motion was not warrented.
H,

Whether or not the Trail Court upheld Utah Law, in the

granting of sanctions in favor of Defendant-Respondant, against
the PIaintiff-Appeal 1 ant, and did not base theses sanctions on
any Rule(s) or Law(s), but on the vague argument, the
Plaintiffs* lack of familarity of the Rules of Civil Procedures,
or could these sanctions be a punishment against the
PIaintiff-Appeal 1 ant for being poor, and representing himself
PRO SE, dening him Equal Treatment and Protection under the law.
I,

Whether or not the PIaintiff-Appeal 1 ant was subjected
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to slander actionable per se, by the Trail Court, after the
Trail Court granted sanctions against the Plaintiff-Appeallant,
the Plaintiff asked if he be allowed to make payments to the
Defendant, submitting a "Affidavit of Imperious Litigant", to
which the Courts* offical response was:
"...Plaintiff apparently believes that because he is
impecumious the Defendant should be made to bear the cost of his
decision to proceed in PROPRIA PERSONA..." Memorandum Decision
April 29, 1983 Honorable Scott Daniels
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
"Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the
public acts, records, and judical proceedings of every otherstate. And congress may be general laws prescribe the manner in
which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and
the effects thereof," Federal Constitution; "rtice 4:1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Both parties were residents of Salt Lake County, Utah were
on the 24th da/

of April, 1986 thev entered into matrimony in

pursuant thereof they maintained a matrimonial domicile on 15?
West 200 North *» 206, in Salt Lake City, Utah.
That on the 14th day of August 1986, the Defendant went to
the town of Ontario, Oregan to visit her brother, a Peter Russel
Baker, who resided in such town.

The Plaintiff came up on the

30th of August, 1936 to pick up and return with the Defendant
from her visit.

Whereupon the 1st day of September the

Defendant wanted to stay two more weeks with her brother, in
Ontario, Oregan, due to marital problems he was going though. On
the 13th dav of September^ 1986 the Defendants' mother had
called a^d said the Defendant had overdosed and was nut of

control.

The Plaintiff went to Ontario, (Vegan, whereupon he

was informed that the Defendant had ran away to Parma, Idaho,
there she disappeared, per se with a truck driver,

T

he

Plaintiff wont to Parma, Idaho where upon the morning of the 14th
the Plaintiff cauierred

with the Chief of Police of Parma,

Idaho, and who verified the disappearance, whereupon the
Plaintiff offjcally filed a "Missing Person" upon the Defendant.
That on or about that da/, the Defendant called Mrs. Gunderson,
the mother of a friend, and convaved that the marriage was over,
and she was seeking a divorce.
That one dav later, September 15, 1986 the Plaintiff called
the Defendants' counsellor, a Dr. John Barber D.D, and relaid
that the Defendant was oka/ and had went to Pamona, California,
that she was unset at the overdose, and wanted to start over
with \)er life.

That she wasn't sure if she would let dworce,

and wanted some time to think.
That eiqht days later, on September ?9, 1996 the Defendant
by and though a Idaho Attorney, R. Brad Massingill filed a
Comolsmt for Divorce, claiminq to meet the Tdahos' requirement
of Si' Weeks to acquire a domicile in said state.
That the offically final Decree of the Court i»i Idaho was
never

sent to the Plaintiff.

Mow the Defendant has given raise

to the issue of oaternit^, claiming that there was a issue of
the marriage, a minor child, Charity Angel Baker.
That after the filing of the Divorce action, U e Defendant
Page 5 - Brief of AoDeallant

returned to Pamona, California, where she was undergoing
psychological treatment.

Upon completion of said treatment,

October 22, 1986 the Defendant returned again to this state,
until November 5, 1936, five davs before the Default Hearing
were she made a personal appearance before the Idaho Court,
Since that time the Defendant has maintain a residence in
hidinq from the Plaintiff, where she kidnapped and held said
mi nor ch iId.
Upon December 6, 1987, the Plaintif* found where the
Defendant was residing a.nd filed on December 16, 1987 suit for
Divorce, and served upon the Defendant the same, where she
and said minor child promptly disappeared.
Futherrnore the Idaho Magistrate issuing said Decree has
been brought before the Idaho Judical Review because the face of
the Idaho Decree finds that the Defendant left the Plaintiff on
September 1, 1986, served the Plaintiff at the domicil in Utah,
and the Complaint was filed on September 29, 1986 showing that
the Defendant did not acquire a domicil in Idaho, but was a Utah
Citizen, an4 acquired said decree by fraud upon the court.

The

Idaho Magistrate in the Divorce Proceedings was brought before
Review for numerous violations of law.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On December 16, 1988, the complaint was filed by the
Plaintiff appearing Pro Se.
On January 11, 1989 complaint was served

upon the Defendant,

whereupon the Officer of Washington County, Idaho certified that
the Defendant was living at Route 2, Box 145, Weiser, Idaho, in
said county.
On January

18, 1983, the Plaintiff filed MOTION FOR

JURISDICTION and serving the same upon the Defendant at said
address, the certified letter was returned by the U.S. Postal
Service arsd marked "ADDRESSES UNKNOWN".
On February 3, 1998, In conferance with the Honorable Scott
Daniels concerning the disappearance of the Defendant and said
Motion for Jurisdiction, where he ruled that service upon the
D^fendant was not made, since the Defendant only recieved twenty
days not the required thirty days on a out of state summons.
Upon looking at the MOTION the Court asked about the alleged
Idaho Decree, whereupon the Plaintiff submitted a copy of the
same, Honorable Scott Daniels read though the same, and inquired
what was the purpose of this complaint.

The Plaintiff replied

to obtain a valid decree of divorce, to which the Honorable
Scott Daniels agreed that said Idaho Decree was not war-renting
good faith, and wasn't valid.
On February 5, 1988, the Plaintiff filed MOTION FOR SERVICE
BY LETTER.
On February 12, 1988, the Motion for service was heard and
so Ordered.

Whereupon the same day the Plaintiff served upon the

Defendant the ADMENDED SUMMONS.
On February 16, 1988, the Plaintiff filed a MOTION FOR

ANNULMENT OF IDAHOS' DECREE, MOTION FOR BLOOD TEST, MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY CUSTODY OF MINOR CHILD, Febraury 16, 1988 due to the
Deiendants' disappearance.
On March 7, 1988, Mr, Peter W. Guyon, made a official
APPEARANCE FOR THE DEFENDANT, and a MOTION TO DISMISS, and
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER, to which on the same day the Plaintiff filed a MOTION
FOR THE DISMISSAL OF PETER W. GUYON, based on him being the
family attorney for the Plaintiff, and this being a direct
conflict of interest.
On March 16, 1998 the PI ai nt i f f .f i 1 ed a RESONSE TO MOTION
TO DISMISS, RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER, and futher filed
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST REQUEST FOR THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.
On March 13^

1988, all six

motions, CBme before the court,

wherein the Court took under advisment the dismissal of Peter W.
Guyon, *r\d

then proceed

to dismiss the case, based on the

invalid Idaho Decree.
Upon the submitting of the purposed Order, the Plaintiff
objected to it being signed, due to counsel misrepresenting

that

the Court had dismiss said action base on the "Good Faith
Clause"- when neither party or the Court had not heard any
comment about such a clause, and said comment was added after
the fact.
On March 21, 1983, the Plaintiff filed a MOTION FOR REVIEW

due to the courts about face concerning the validity o-f the
Idaho Decree when no new evidence was submitt to show the
Defendant had acquire a domicil in Idaho, and the only change
in said case was the appearance of counsel -for the Defendant.
On March 293 1^83 the Defendants' Counsel filed a MOTION TO
DISMISS AND FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES, whereupon March 31, 1988 the
Plaintiff filed RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR ATTORNEYS'
FEES.
On April 1, 1988 the Plaintiffs' MOTION FOR REVIEW came
legally and lawfully before the Court, whereupon the Court took
said motion under advisement, and request from Plaintiff all
documents sent to Idaho, and request a Memorandum from
Defendant.

Whereupon the Defendants' counsel illegally arid

without ar\%> notice, whatsoever brought forth his MOTION TO
DISMISS AMD ATTORNEY FEES, whereupon without an/ o^al argument
the Court granted said attorneys' fees against the Plaintiff.
On April 4, 1^88, the Plainriff submitted to the Court and
counsel the requested documents, AFFIDAVIT OF IMPERIOUS LITIGANT,
AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD TROY WIEDEUSCH <STAKER), and letter asking
about misrepresent ions' Defendants' counsel made to the court.
On April 5, 1988, the Defendants' counsel submitted a
purposed Order, granting him a extra week uponwith to respond,
a.f)d set a date upon which sanctions should be paid. The Plaintiff
objected being the Court specifically Order Counsel to only
prepare Order concerning sanctions of $150.00 against the
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Plaintiff.
On April 11, 1988, Defendants' counsel -filed the MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR REVIEW, and MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS UNDER RULE 11, concerning the Plaintiff allc-gation of
misrepresentation to the court.
On April 13, 1988 the Plaintiff filed a MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SANCTION UNDER RULE 11,
wherein he claimed the Defense of Truth, and outlined said
misrepresentat ions.
On April 18, 1988 the Defendants' counsel filed MOTION FOR
CONTEMPT OF COURT AMD ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.
On April 20, 1988, Plaintiff filed MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT AND ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.
On April 21, 1983 Defendants' counsel filed MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER, requesting protection from Discovery.
On April 25, t983 Plaintiff filed a MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER, in which the Plaintiff counterpetitioned the Court for two counts of Contempt.
On April 29, 1988 the Honorable Scott Daniels handed down
his MEMORANDUM DECISION, in which he upholds his decision to
dismiss said action.
On May 5, 1988 the Plaintiff filed a MOTION FOR STAY UPON
Appeal.
On May 9, 1988 the Defendants' Counsel filed a OBJECTIONS
AND MOTION FOR ADDITION ATTORNEYS' FEES, MOTION AND ORDER FOR

SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS, in which the Defendants' counsel
requested the seizure and freezing of the Plaintiffs' assets,
father Counsel ORDERING this motion unlawfully

into Court on May

13, 1^88, not giving a five day notice as required by

law.

Or. May 11, 1988, the Plaintiff submitted a MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION AND ORDER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDING.
On May 13, 1988 the Plaintiffs' MOTION FOR STAY UPON APPEAL,
and Defendants' MOTION AND ORDER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS
came before the Court with the Plaintiff filing a REBUTAL TO
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION AND MOTION FOR ADDITION ATTORNEYS' FEE,
whereupon the default of the Defendant the Court dismiss MOTION
AMD ORDER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS and granted a STAY UPON
APPEAL, upon posting of a SUPERSEDEAS BOND, and a NOTICE OF
APPEAL, which was done forwith,
DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT
The Disposition of the Trial Court, was to dismiss said
Complaint for the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
on March 18, 1988.

Futher upholding this decision, and adding

the "Good Faith Clause" of the U.S. Constitution

in the Trail

Courts' MEMORANDUM DECISION, April 29, 1988.
RELEVANT FACTS ABOUT ISSUE A
1.

The Defendant on April 24, 1986 upon their marriage

licenses, where she described herself as being a resident of the
State of Utah, and futhermore had legally acquired a domicil in
this state, and was a bona fide citizen thereof.
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Marriage

License, Salt Lake Countv, Utah, April 24, 1986.
2.

That on November 10,

1988 in a Court of Law, and

under oath, the Defendant described herself that as of September
1, 1996 a bona fide citizen of Utah, whereas on that date she
had left her husband and lived apart from hirn.

Paragraph 3,

Idaho Decree of Divorce, November 10, 1986
3.

That the Plaintiff presented under oath, that on

September 21, 1986 the Defendant was found residing in Pamona,
California where she was undergoing psychological
evidence has been shown to the contrary.

treatment.

No

Affidavit of Ronald

Troy Wiedbusch (Staker), March 16, 1988.
4.

That the Plaintiff presented under oath, that on

September 13, 1986 the Defendant in the State of Idaho was a
"MISSING PERSON",

Affidavit of Ronald Troy Wiedbusch (Staker),

March 16, 1*83.
5.

That on September 29, 1986, a R. Brad ^assingill on

behalf of the Defendant, submitts a Complaint for Divorce, in
the foreign state of Idaho, in which it is alleged that the
Defendant has resided in

Idaho for the Six

acquire a domicil in that state.

Week period to

Idaho Complaint for Divorce,

Allegation # 1, September 29, 1986.
6.

That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court, and under

oath, that on October 22, 1986, the Defendant again returned to
this state.

No evidence to the contrary has been submitted.

Affidavit of Ronald Troy Wiedbusch (Staker), March 16, 1938.

7.

That on November 5, 1986 the Defendant called both the

Plaintiff and his father, in which conversation she described
herself as on the road for the last two months with a truck
driver, and was coming down from a drug trip, and Yad went to
Idaho-

That no evidence to the contrary has been submitted,

Affidavit of Ronald Troy Wiedbusch (Staker), March 16, 1983.
8.

That the Default Hearing was held in the foreign state

of Idaho, in which the foreign forum issued said decree, in
which the Mr, Wiedbusch <c<taker) failed to answer or otherwise
appear,

Idaho Decree oi

Divorce, November 10, 1986.

RELEVANT FACTS ABOUT ISSUE B
1.

That the Plaintiff presented to the court, and under

certification thereof, that the Defendant was not a "Pona FideM
resident of the foreign forum, atid had used FRAUD thereupon to
proof to the foreign forum that she had meet the requirement to
acquire a dmucil therein, namely a SIX UEEK RESIDENCE. No
evidence to the contrary has been submitted. Motion for
annullment of Idahos' decree, February 16, 1^88,
2.

That the Defendant by and though the Idaho Decree has

twice tried to prosecute the Plaintiff on felony charges of
non-support of minor child, the first time three days after
notification of the existance of said minor child, the second
time, five days after Plaintiff filed this complaint,
evidence to the contrary has been submitted.

No

Idaho Complaint

for support under Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,
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December 21, 198*7, and Response to Defendants' Motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, March 16, 1988
3.

That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court, and under

certification thereof, that the minor child of the marriage
pursuant to Title 30-2-10 of the Utah Code of Law, the Defendant
did illegally and unlawfully take minor child out of the
homestead thereof, that the Defendant is a drug abuser, and said
minor child thereby is in danger.

No evidence has been

submitted to the contrary. Motion for temporary custody of minor
child, February 16, 1988.
4.

That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court and under

certification thereof, requested the whereabout of minor child
and if minor child is safe, twice though discovery, to which
Defendant and Counsel refused to cooperate. Response to
Defendants* Motion to Dismiss. March 16, 1983. Plaintiffs* First
Request for the production of Documents', March 16, 1988.
5.

That in a Court of Law, and under oath thereof, th*=*

Defendant described that the Plaintiff was not the father of
minor child. Petition for the termination of parental rights,
Mav 25, 1988
RELEVANT FACTS ABOUT ISSUE C
1.

Th*\t on March 16. 1988, the Plaintiff in accordance

with Hie Pules of Civil Procedure, served upon the Defendant by
and though her counsel, with a document of discovery, to which
the time has past, and no attempt has been made to comply.

Plaintiffs' First Request for the Production of Documents, March
16, 1933.
2.

That the Trial Court two days later, dismiss said

complaint, on "...The absence of compelling evidence..." Orderdismissing Action, unsigned and undated,
3.

That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court and upon

certification thereof, that the Trial Court dismissed said
action, when the Defendant produced no evidence except the void
decree, and the Plaintiff produced as evidence against the Idaho
Decree

seven case rulings, four Utah laws, and two affidavits

prior to the dismissing of the case, Mo evidence to the contrary
has been submitted,
4.

Motion for Review, March 21, 1933.

That the Trial Court upheld its decision to dismiss

this Complaint, on "...No compelling evidence..." in its
Memorandum Decision, April 29, 1Q88.
REVELANT FACTS ABOUT ISSUE D
t.

That the Defendant was found to have disappeared

on February 12, 1983. Mo evidence has been show otherwise. Court
Order, February 12, 1988,
2.

That Peter W. Quvcn made a appearance twenty three

days after the disappearance of the Defendant.

Appearance of

Defendant, March 7, 1988*
3.

That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court, and upon

certificate thereof, stated that Peter W. Guvon admitted to him,
that he did not know where the De-fendant was. No evidence to the
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contrary has been submitted. Motion for Review, March 21, 1933.
4.

That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court, and upon

certification thereof, stated that due to the Defendants' or
Counsel, not cooperating in discovery, that Peter W. Guyon IS
NOT representing the Defendant, but a foreign third party, that
have a interest in the outcome of this case.
been submitted to show otherwise.

No evidence has

Memorandum in opposition

Defendants' Motion for protective order, April 25, 1938.
5.

That the finances of the Defendant are 1) she is

unemployed, 2) that she is receiving $200.00 per month from
welfare, 3) that she has two attorney of higher than normal
prices. No evidence to the contrary has been submitted. Response
to Motion for Rule 40 sanctions, June 20, 1988,
6.

That the Defendant by and though her Idaho Attorney,

filed suit on 25th of May, 1988, concerning issues pending here,
that Peter W. Guyon fights against.

That said suit must have

been filed in Idaho with complete ignorance to the proceedings
here. No evidence has been submitted otherwise.

Response to

Motion for Rule 40 sanctions, June 20, 1988,
RELEVANT FACTS ABOUT ISSUE E
1.

That Peter W. Guyon is the Plaintiffs' familys*

attorney, and is representing them in a ongoing case, that will
be resolved about 1994.
2.

Affidavit of Diana Kay Puie, March 1988.

That only because of Peter W. Guyon client

relationship with the PI aintiff-Appeal 1 ant family he has access

to psychological report conducted on the Plaintiff while a minor
child in the above divorce proceedings, and other sensitive
reports conducted in the years, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983,
1984, and 1985 on the Plaintiff, that another attorney would not
have access to, Affidavit of Diana Kay Buie, March 1988,
RELEVANT FACTS ABOUT ISSUE F
1.

That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court, and under

certification thereof, a Memorandum of Plaintiff in opposition
to Defendants' Motion for sanctions under Rule 11, that it is
alleged in this that Peter W. Guyon submitted statments that
carried

a false impression to the Court, of the subject matter,

that such statments were not only on Motions that he submitted
but on offically Court Orders.
otherwise has been submitted.

Mo refutation or evidence to show
Memorandum of Plaintiff

in

Opposition to Defendants' Motion for sanctions under Rule 11,
April 13, 1988
2,

That the agrument that Peter W, Guyon incorporated

into the purposed Court Order is the sole agrument that the
Courts' decision to uphold its former decision that of the "Good
Faith Clause".

That Mr. Guyon is an officer of the Court,

no evidence to the contrary has been submitted.

That

Memorandum

Decision, Judge Scott Daniels, April 29, 1988, Response

to

Motion for sanctions under Rule 11, April 13, 1988.
REVELANT FACTS ABOUT ISSUE G
1.
PaQe
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certificate thereof, that in the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,
that each issue raised therein was be-fore the Court and was on
the calander -for hearing, that the Motion was an attempt to
increase litigation and served no purpose. No evidence to the
contrary was submitted, Plaintiffs* Repsonse to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss, March 16, 1988.
2.

That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court and upon

certificate thereof, that the Defendant filed a Motion for Order
of contempt and entry of judgment, that each issue was before
the Court, and the Motion was submitted to increase litigation
and harassment. No evidence to the contrary was otherwise
submitted. Memorandum of Plaintiff in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Order of Contempt and for entry of judgment, April
20, 1988.
3.

That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court and upon

certification thereof, that Defendants' Motion and Order in
Supplemental proceedings, contained issues that were before this
Court, and that the Motion was submitted to increase litigation
and far

harassment

*

No evidence

to

the

contrary

shown,

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion and Order

was otherwise

in supplemental proceedings, May 11, 1988.
4«

That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court and upon

certification thereof, that Defendants' Order in Supplemental
proceedings, contained issues that were before this Court, and
that the purposed Order was submitted to increase litigation and

for harassment.
shown.

No evidence to the contrary was otherwise

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants* Motion and Order

in supplemental proceedings, May 11, 1938.
REVELANT FACTS ABOUT ISSUE H
1.

That the Motion to Dismiss and for Attornevs' Fees and

Cost, was submitted to the Court on March 29, 1983. Motion to
Dismiss and for Attorneys* Fees and Cost, March 29, 1983.
2.

That the Court Record contains no Notice for the

hearing of the Motion to Dismiss and for attorney fees and cost.
Wiedbusch v. Wiedbusch D-8^-4844
3.

That the Motion to Dismiss and for attorneys fees and

Cost was heard and ruled upon, three days later, the 1st day of
April, 1983. Purposed Order and Judgment, re April 1, 1983
Unsigned and Undated. Motion for Order of Contempt and for entry
of Judgment, April 13, 1988.
4.

That the Plaintiff objected on April 1, 1^33 to the

Motion to Dismiss and for Attorney fees and cost, and the Court
heard the Plaintiffs' pleas and ruled otherwise, that an Order
to that effect was submitted and again the Plaintiff objected.
Motion for Order of Contempt and for entrv of Judgment, April
18, 1938.
RELEVANT FACTS ABOUT ISSUE I
1.

That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court an affidavit

of impecunious litigant, in that he was too poor to bear the
expenses of this action.
Pa^e
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April 4, 1988.
2.

That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court, and upon

certification thereof, that the Court awarded sanctions, against
the Plaintiff, in the amount of $150,00 to the Defendant, for
the sole reason that the Plaintiff was poor and could not afford
an attorney, No evidence to the contrary was submitted. Exhibit
"A", Plaintiffs' Rebuttal to Defendants' Objections and Motion
for Additional Attorneys fees and cost, May 13, 1988.
3.

That the sanctions were granted in recognition of the

litigation Plaintiff was pursuing on his own, and the
inconvenience to counsel in responding to the same, and the
sanction was to reward Counsel because of the Plaintiffs'
inability to have counsel because of his poverty.
to the contrary has been otherwise shown.

No evidence

Motion for Order of

Contempt and entry of Judgment, April 18, 1988.
4.

That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court and upon

certification thereof, that the Plaintiff upon submitting the
above affidavit, in a letter of the same day, asked that if the
Court upheld its' decision to award sanctions, that it allow the
Plaintiff pay ten payments of $15.00, due to his poverty, as the
affidavit attest to.
otherwise shown.

No evidence to the contrary has been

Exhibit "A", Plaintiffs' Rebuttal to

Defendants' Objections and Motion for additional Attorneys' fees
and cost, Mav 13, 1988.
5.

That the Trial Court, stated Plaintiff apparently

believes that because he is impecumiaus the Defendant should be
made to bear the cost of his decision to proceed in PROPRIA
PERSONA.

Memorandum Decision, Honorable Scott Daniels, April

29, 1938.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE A
That the Defendant did not become a BONA FIDE citizen of
Idaho and failed to acquire a domicil in Idaho, that said Decree
was granted by fraud on the Court, that the requirement to
become a BONA FIDE citizen of Idaho and acquire a Domicil
therein, is stated on the face of the Idaho Decree, this being a
resident ior

the term of Six Weeks, that on fhe face of the

Idaho Decree, it states that the Defendant left the Domicil of
the Plaintiff, who has resided in Utah all his life, and went to
Idaho on the 1st day of September, 1986, and that suit against
the Plaintiff commenced only 28 days later, that of September
29, 1986, proving that she could not have meet this Six Week
E'equir merit and that she did not become a citizen of Idaho, and
could not have acquired a domicil therein.

That the Idaho Court

th^*-eof did not have the jurisdiction, and thus the Idaho Decree
is invalid, havinq no power or effect, and Idaho action pursuant
to this action is moot.
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE A
The Idaho Divorce Decree is not entitled to full faith and
credit since the Plaintiff therein acquired NO Bona Fide domicil
in Idaho, even though the decree recites that such a bona fide
PaQe
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dornicil was acquired.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in divorce cases rests
upon dornicil, or at residence enimo manendi, of at least one of
the parties in the divorce forum.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent an
inquiry in a state other than the divorce forum into the bona
fide of this domicil or residence.

Jenkins v. Jenkins, 239 Ala 141, 194 So 493; Wynne v. Wynne, 20
Cal App (2d) 131, 66 P(2d) 467; Sears v. Sears, 6? App DC 379,
92 F (2d) 530; Adams v. Adams, 191 Ga 537, 13 SE(2d) 173; Grein
v, Grein, 303 111 App 398, 25 NE(Zd) 409; State v. Wenzel, 1S5
La 808, 171 So 38; Usen v. Usen, J 36 Me 480, 13 A(2d) 738, 128
ALR 1449; Nor is v. Noris, 200 Minn 246, 273 NW 708 (by
implication); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 174 Miss 643, 165 So 414?
Lippincott v. Lippincott, 141 Neb 186, 3 NW (2d) 207, 140 ALR
901; Sprague v. Sprague, 131 NT Eq 104, 23 A(2d) 810, Golden v.
Golden, 41 MM 356, 68 P(2d) 28; Horowitz v. Horowitz, 58 Rl 396,
192 A 796 (by implication); Dry v, Rice, 147 Va 331, 137 SE 473.
See also Wilkes v. Wilkes, 245 Ala 54, 16 So(2d) 15; Hooker v.
Hooker, 130 Conn 41, 32 A(2d) 68; Re Ainscow, --Del --, 34 A(2d)
593J Hobson v. Dempsey Constr. Ca.9
232 Iowa 1226, 7 NW(2d) 896;
Brown v. Hall, 385 111 260, 52 NE(2d) 781; Atkins v. Atkins, 386
111 345, 54 NE(2d) 488; Bowditch v. Dowditch, 314 Mass 410, 50
NE(2d) 65; Wolf v. Wolf, 134 NJ Eq 8, 34 A(2d) J50; Mascola v.
Mascola, 134 MJ Eq 48, 33 A(2d) 864; Re Holmes, 291 NY 261, 52
NE (2d) 424; Re Bingham, 265 App Div463, 39 NYSf2d) 756;
McCarthy v. McCarthy, 179 Misc 623, 39 NYS(2d) 922; Smith v.
Smith, 72 Ohio App 203, 50 NE(2d) 889? Com. ex, rel. Esenwein v.
Esenwein, 348 Pa 455, 35 A(2d) 335.

The state under Article 4: Section 1 of the Constitution of
the United States is obliged to give full faith and credit to a
foreign divorce decree

in the ABSENCE OF FRAUD.

Paris v. Hope (CCA 2d) 29B F 727; Frey v. Frey, 61 App DC 232,
59 F(2d) 1046? Davis v. Davis, 305 US 32, 83 L ed 26, 59 S Ct 3,
113 ALR 1518$ Loughran v, Loughran, 292 US 216, 78 L ed 1219, 54
S Ct 684; Atherton v. Atherton, 131 US 155, 45 L ed 794, 21 S Ct
544; Kirby v. Kirby, 143 Kan 430, 55 P(2d) 356; Voorhies v.
Voorhies, 134 La 406, 166 So 121$ Cope v. Cope, 123 MJ Eq 190,
196 A 422? Cardinale v, Cardinal*, 3 Cal(2d) *?62, 63 P(2d) 351?
Miller v. Miller, 200 Iowa 1193, 206 NW 262; Com. ex rel.
Cronhardt v. Cronhardt, 127 Pa Super Ct 501, 193 A 484; Renner
v. Renner, 13 NJ Mis P 749, 181 A 191; 19 CJ p 370, section 336.

When a martial partner goes to a State solely for divorce
purposes, to obtain a decree of divorce by fraud on the court,
they do not carry the RES with them, and the courts of the
State to which he has gone have no jurisdiction to entertain
their divorce suit,
If a party goes to this jurisdiction other than that of
their domicil, for the purpose of procurring a divorce, and has
a residence there for that purpose onlv, such residence is not a
bona fide, and does not confer upon the courts of that state or
countv jurisdiction over the marriage relation, and decree

they

may assume to make would be void as to the other party.

Bell v. Bell, 131 US 175, Coaly, Const. Lim p. 401; Hanover v.
Turner, 14 Mass, 227, 7 Am Dec 203; Greenlaw v. Greenlaw, 12
N.H. "225? Batchelder v, Batchelder, 14 N.H. 380; Payson v.
Payson, 34 N.H. 518; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 35 N.H. 474.

Recticals oi

the decrees entered

in divorce cases of one

State are not binding on the court of another State; they may be
contrad icted.
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The BONA FIDES of the residence of a party who obtains a
divorce in one State may be inquired into by the courts of
another State.

Bell v. Bell, 131 US 1"?5, Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 US 179,
Andrews v. Andrews, 183 US 14? Haddock v. Haddock, 201 US 502;
Simmons v, Simmons, 57 App DC 216} Cheeley v. Clayton, 110 US
701; Frev v. Frey, 61 App DC 232,

Change of citizenship, as distinguished from change of
residence, is not always so simple a matter, and a change of
residence does not itself necessarily involve any change of
citizenship.

Where the intent is not clear, it has to be

inferred from the circumstances surrounding the act.
The fact that the record of the divorce decree in Idaho
recites the jurisdictional fact of residence can make no
d ifference,

Hard v, Shipman, 6 Barb. 623; Bolton v. Schriever,
135 NY 73; Matter of Law, 56 App Div 454; Ferguson v. Crawford,
70 NY 2735 Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall 457; Thorman v. Frame,
176 US 350; Plant v. Harrison, 36 Misc. Rep. 649,

The recitals of facts in a decree may be contradicted as to
the facts neccessary to give the court jurisdiction; and, if it
be shown that such facts did not exist, the record -will be a
nullity, notwithstanding it mav recite that they did exist.
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Fell v. Bell, 181 US 175 Thompson v. Whitman, 13 W M 1 457, 21 L
ed 897? Knowles v. Logansports Gaslight & Coke Co. 19 Wall 61,
22 L ed 72; Sewall v. Sewall, 122 Mass 156, 23 Am Rep 299;
Shannnon v. Shannon, 4 Allen, 134; Leith v. Leith, 39 N.H. 20;
Gregory v. Gregory, 78 Me. 18*?, 57, Am Rep 792, 3 Atl. 280;
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 NY 30, 7 Am Rep 299; Cross v. Cross, 108
MY 628, 15 NE 333; Kerr v. Kerr,
41 MY 272; People v. D a w e U , 25
Mich 247, 22 Am Rep 260; Reed v. Reed, 52 Mich 121, 50 Am Rep
247, 17 MW 720; Chaney v. Br van, 15 Lea, 589.

It appearing therefore, from the facts found, that neither
Mr. Wiedbusch

(Staker), nor Mrs. Wiedbusch

(Baker) had a domicil

in the Idaho, this even appearing upon the face of the Idaho
record, the courts of Idaho had no jurisdiction to grant any
divorce whatever, and the divorce is therefore absolutely void.

Schouler, Husb. & Wife section 574; Bell v. Bell, 181 US 175;
Sewall v. bewail, 122 Mass. 156, 23 Am Rep 299; People v.
D a w e U , 25 Mich. 247, 22 Am Rep 260.

Even the presence, within its territory, of the inhabitants
of other states, gives it no authority to grant a divorce and
thus change their marriage status.
Gregorv v, Gregory, 7 8 Me 187, 57 Am Rep 792, 3 Atl 280; Foss v.
Foss, 58 N.H. 283? Leith v. Leith, 39 M.H. 20; Lane v. Lane, 2
Mass. 167; Squire v. Squire, 3 Mass. 184; Choate v. Choate 3
Mass 391? Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. 260; Kimball v. Kimball, 63
N.H, 598, 4 Atl. 702; Dutcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis 658.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 325 US 226, in delivering the
opinion of the Court makes the following statments that directly
reflect upon this case.
Paqe 25 - Brief of Aooeallant

"The implications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
Article 4, Section 1, o-f the constitution, first received the
sharp analysis o-f this Court in Thompson v. Whitman, 13 Wall
(US) 457 ed 897. Theretofore uncritical notions about the scope
of that Clause had been expressed in the early case of Mills v.
Duryee, 7 Cranch (US) 4Sis 3 L ed 411. The "doctrine" of that
case, was that ''the judgment o-f a state court should have the
same credit, validity, and effect, in es/ery court in the United
States, which it had in the state where it was pronouced."
This utterance, WHEN PUT TO THE TEST, as it was in Thompson
v. Whitman, supra, was found to be too loose. Thompson v.
Whitman made it clear that the doctrine of Mills v. Duryee comes
into operation only when in the language of KENT, "The
jurisdiction of the court in another state is not impeached,
either as to the subject matter or person." Only then is "the
record of the judgment....entitied to full faith and credit." 1
Kent, Commentaries, 2d ed 1832, 261 note b."
The Court futher went on,

quoting:

"To give it the force of a judgment in another state, it
must be made a judgment there." M'Elmoyle v, Cohen, 13 Pet (US)
312, 10 L ed 177, 183,
"It can be made a judgment there only if the court
purporting to render orginal judgment had the power to render
such j udgment."
"Under our system of law, judical power to grant a
divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded upon dcmicil.
Bell v. Pell, 1S1 US 175 45 L ed 804, 2! S Ct 551? Andrews v.
Andrews, 188 US 14, 47 L ed 366, 23 S Ct 237. The framers of
the Constitution were familar with THIS jurisdictional
prerequiste, and since 1789 NEITHER THIS COURT NOR AMY OTHER
COURT IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING WORLD HAS QUESTIONED IT. Domicil
implies a nexus between person and place of such permanence as
to control the creation of legal relations and responsibilities
of the utmost significance."
The Court futher stated:
"The jurisdictional requirement of domicil is freed from
the confusing refinements about "matrimonial domicil".
It is noteworthy that the Court did not in an/ way infringe
upon the requirment of domicil. but in futher support thereof
the Court stated the following:

"The State of domiciliary orgin, should not be bound by an
unfounded, even if not collusicve, recital in the record of a
court of another State. As to the truth or existence of a fact,
like that of domicil, upon which depends the power to exert
judical authority, a State not a party to the exertion of such
judicial authority in another State but seriously affected by it
has a right when asserting its own unquestioned authority, to
ascertain the truth or existence of that crucial fact."
"For domicil is the foundation of probate jurisdiction
precisely as it is that of divorce. The ruling in Tilt v.
Kelsey, 207 US 43, 52 L ed 95, 28 S Ct 1, regarding the probate
of a will, is equally applicable to a sister-State divorce
decree: "the full faith and credit due to the proceedings of the
New Jersey court do no require that the courts of New York shall
be bound by its adjudication on the question of domicil. ON THE
CONTRARY, it is open to the courts of any State in the trail of
a collateral issue to determine upon the evidence produced the
true domicil of the deceased."... In short, the decree of
divorce is a conclusive adjudication of everything EXCEPT the
jurisdictional facts upon which it is founded, and domicil is a
jurisdictional fact."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, futher stated:
"In seeking a decree of divorce outside the State in which
he has therefore maintained his marriage, a person is
necessarily involved in the legal situation created by our
Federal System whereby one State can grant a divorce of validity
in other States, ONLY if the applicant has a BONA FIDE domicil
in the other State of the Court purporting to dissolve a prior
legal marriage."
"However harsh and unjust North Carolina's (Utah 5 divorce
laws may be thought to be, petitioners were bound to obey them
while retaining residential and domiciliary ties in that state.
NO JUSTIFIABLE purpose is served by imparting constitutional
sanctity to the efforts of petitioners to establish a false and
ficitious domicil in Nevada (Idaho). Such a result would only
tend to promote wholesale disregard of North Carolina's (Utah)
divorce laws by its citizens, thus putting an end to "the
existence of all efficacious power on the subject of divorce."
Andrews v. Andrews, 188 US 32, 47 L ed 369, S Ct 237. Certainly
no policy of Nevada (Idaho) didctates lending the full faith and
credit clause to protect actions grounded in deceit."
It is important to note, that Idaho has specifically denied
all their judical courts, power to grant a divorce, if the

the application has not been there for Six (65 full weeks next
preceeding the commencement of the action.

Idaho Code of Law, Title 32-701, Smestad v. Smestad, 94 Idaho
181, 484 P,2d 730 (1971); Bezold v. Bezold, 95 Idaho 131, 504
P.2d 404 (1972); Hampshire v. Hampshire, 70 Idaho 522 P.2d
950; Robinson v, Robinson, ^0 Idaho 122, 212 P.2d 1031J
Reublmann v* Reublmann, 33 Idaho 159, 220 P. 404

In a case were the basic facts are the same basic facts as
this case, that case was heard by the United States Supreme
Court, the facts are the husband went to Nevada there he filed
for suit after staying the full Nevada requirments, a North
Carolina sheriff served personally on his wife the complaint and
summons, the wife did not appear or answer.

The Nevada decree

stated as follows, "the plaintiff has been and now is a bona
fide an<i continuous resident of the County of Clark, State of
Nevada, and had been such a resident far more than six weeks
immediately preceeding the commencement of this action in the
manner prescribed by law", it was contended that the petitioner
went to Nevada not to establish a residence but solely for the
purpose of taking advantage of the laws of that State to obtain
a divorce through fraud upon that court.

The US Supreme Court

upheld this, and Mr. Justice Douglas, stated in delivering the
opinion of the Court, in 317 US 237, the following:
"The intimation in the majority opinion that the Nevada
divorces were collusive suggests that the second theory on which
they tried the case may have been an alternative ground for the

decision below, adequate to sustain the judgment under the rule
of Bell v. Bell, 181 US 175, 45 L ed 804, 21 S Ct 551
a case
in which this Court held that a decree o-f divorce was not
entitled to full faith and credit when it had been granted on
constructive service by the courts of a state in which neither
spouse was domiciled."
"Domicil of the Plaintiff, immaterial to jurisdiction in a
personal action is recognized in the Haddock case (Haddock v.
Haddock, 201 US 5625 and elsewhere (Beale, Conflict of Laws,
Section 110.1) as ESSENTIAL in order to give the court
jurisdiction which will entitle the divorce decree to
extraterritorial effect... "
"Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate
concern in the marital status of persons domiciled within its
borders. The marriage relation creates problems of large social
importance. Protection of offspring, property interest, and the
enforcment of marital responsibilities are but a few of
commanding problems in the field of domestic relations with
which the state must deal."
In this same case, Mr. Justice Murphy, commented to the
court as follows:
"In recognition of the paramount interest of the state of
domicile over the marital status of its citizens, this Court has
held that actual good faith domicile of least one party is
essential to confer authority and jurisdiction on the courts of
a state to reader a decree of divorce that will be entitled to
extraterritorial effect under the "Full faith and credit clause".
"Both Nevada and North Carolina have rights in this regards
rights are entitled to recognition. The conflict between those
rights here should not be resolved by extending into North
Carolina the effects of Nevada's action through a perfunctory
application of the literal language of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause with the result that measures which North Carolina has
adopted to safeguard the welfare of her citizens in this area of
legitimate governmental concern are undermined."
Mr. Justice Jackson, in this same case commented to the
court as follows:
"I cannot join in exerting the judical power of the Federal
Goverment to compel the State of North Carolina to subordinate
its own law to the Nevada divorce decrees...It subjects
Paaa
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matrimonial laws of each state to important limitations and
exceptions that it must be recognize within its own borders and
easier system of divorce, in which neither party has ever lived,
and there commence proceedings without personal service of
process. The spouse remaining within the state of domicile need
never know of the proceedings. Or, if it comes to one's
knowlege, the choice is between equa!3y useless alternatives:
one is to ignore the foreign proceedings, in which case the
marriage is quite certain to be dissolved; the other is to
follow the complaining spouse to the state of his choice and
there defend under the laws which grant the dissolution on
relatively trivial grounds. To declare that a state is
powerless to protect either its own policy or the family rights
of its people against such consequences has serious
const i tut ional imp 1icat ions."
"...Divorce judgments asking for our enforcement under the
full faith and credit clause, unlike judgments arising out of,
commercial transactions and the like, MUST also foe supported by
good-faith domicile of one of the parties within the judgment
state. Such is certainly a reasonable requirement. A state can
have no legitimate concern with the matrimonial status of two
persons, neither of whom lives within its territory."
CONCLUSION ON ISSUE A
1.

That Utah can legal impeach the Idaho decree

on the

lack of jurisdiction, without violating the "Full Faith and
Credit Clause" of the Constitution.
US SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT section 360 - of sister state full faith and credit.
"The full faith and credit clause operates only with
respect to judgments rendered by a court whose jurisdiction,
either as to the subject matter or person, is not impeached."
2.

That the Idaho decree does not have any effect on the

Utah Court, until it has been made a judgment in Utah.
US SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, Section 356 - of sister state conelusiveness,
"The full faith and credit clause does not make a
Page 30- Brief of Appeal lanl-

sister-state judgment a judqment in anotner state, but to give
it that effect, it must be made a judgment there, which can be
done only if the court purporting to render the original
judgment had power to pass on the merits."
3.

That this power to p?ss on the merits, is based upon

domicil of one of the parties.
US SUPREME COURT DIVORCE, Section 4

- jurisdiction to

grant - domicil as basis.
"Judical power to grant a divorce is founded on domicil,"
A.

That the State of Idaho has spefically denied all their

courts, the power to grant a divorce if the applicant has done
acquired a domicil in Idaho and resided in this domicil Six (6)
full weei'S prior to the commencement of the divorce action.
IDAHO CODE OF LAW, Title 32-701 - residence required by the
plaintiff.
''A divorce must not be granted unless the plaintiff has
been a resident of the state for Six (6) full weeks next
precedinq the commencement of the action,"
E.

That the Plaintiff by a undisputed affidavit proved

that he was a resident of Utah all his life, that if Mrs,
Wiedbusch left him on September 1, 1986, which fact was proven
true bv the Idaho Co«»rt, she could not have resided in Idaho for
Six (6) full weeks prior to the commencement of the Idaho action.
4.

That domicil is a residence of permanence, in which

legal relationships can and or made.
US SUPREME COURT DIVORCE, Section 1 - permanence of
residence as essential.

"Domicil implies a nexus between person a,nd place of such
permanence as to control the creation of legal relationships and
responsibilities of the utmost significance."
A.

That the Plaintiff, by a undisputed affidavit, proved

that Mrs. Wiedbusch was in Oregan until September 13, 1^36, at
which time she went to Parma, Idaho and disappeared that day,
that on "September 14, 1986 the Defendant, Mrs. Wiedbusch was
offically listed in the state of Idaho as a "Missing Person".
That with all this evidence as this Court has, and the
requirements that the US Supreme Court has set down for all
Courts to follow, there is no way that the Defendant could have
any domicil in Idaho prior to the commencement of the Idaho
action, that a "Missing Person" could not be construed to be
able to create ar\y legal relations between herself and Idaho of
any signifance, and for her testimony to show that she could not
have meet that jurisdictional fact, the Idaho Decree can not be
thought of as anything but fraud upon the court.

That Idaho

legislature has specifically denied all their courts power, if
the jurisdictional fact does not exist.

Therefore the Idaho

Decree is null and void, there was no domicil in Idaho by either
party.
decree.

The Idaho Court was by law ordered not to issue this
They had no judical power by law.

Most importantly the

Idaho Court did not have the power to pass on the merits.
In the interest of protecting the citizens of Utah from
unlawfully prosecution, ^nd upholding the outlines of the
Supreme Court of this Land, this Decree must be impeached.
PaQe 32 - Brief nf Annsana^.f

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE B
That the Memorandum Decision does not uphold the
PI aint if -f s* rights and protection under the Constitution of
Utah.

That a Decree of Divorce is a proceeding that involves

the rights o-f each party and the issue of the marriage, that
this, by law and upheld by the US SUPREME COURT, to protect each
citizen, is governored and regulated by each sovereign State, to
protect and uphold the responsibilities of each party in a
martial relation,

That this State can not either directly or

indirectly be deprived of its sovereignity to regulate the
status of its domiciled citizens.

That the Defendant fled this

State to escape the hard divorce laws that was set down, to
protect our citizens from the vpry
the Plaintiff.

effect that has occured to

That the Defendant left the marriage for a cause

that occured within this st^te, fled to Idaho, where she did not
meet the residence requirment, and illegally obtained a Decree,
unlawful 1 filing in Idaho, and used it to harass the Plaintiff.
DETAILS OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE B
That it is the right of ev&ry

person to be secure and

protected from fear, intimidation, harassment, and harm caused
by the activities of groups and individuals.
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy
and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and
protect property..." The Constitution of Utah Artice l; Section 1
That the States have the dutv to protect their citizens,
from the citizens who go to another forum in another State to

obtain a divorce.

That Utah was deprived of its soverign

rights, to protect its citizens, the Plaintiff and minor child,
and uphold their rights as to the marriage, and uphold both
parties rights, and impose sanctions and restriction upon both
parties, which in fact were Utah citizens.
That the US Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Gray, m

131 US 166,

Atherton v. Atherton, states as follows:
"It is obvious that marriage, as a domestic relation,
emerged from the contract which created it, is known and
recognized as such throughout the civilized world; that it gives
rights and imposes duties and restrictions upon the parties to
it, affecting their social and moral condition, of the measure
of which every civilized State, and certainly every State of
this Union, is the sole judge so far as to its own citizens or
subjects are concerned, and should be so deemed by other
civilized, and especially sister States; that a State cannot be
deprived, directly or indirectly, of its sovereign power to
regulate the status of its own domiciled subjects and citizens,
by the fact that the subjects and citizens of other States, as
related to them, are interested in that status, and in such
matter has a right, under the general law..."
In support to safeguard the rights of each States citizens
and the rights and power of sovernity that each State has, Mr.
Justice Grav, futher stated in the opinion of the Court, the
Court upheld and advanged the statute of Massachusetts, as
follows;
"When an inhabitant of this State goes into another State
or country to obtain a divorce for any cause occuring here, and
whilst the parties resided here, or for any cause which would
not authorize a divorce by the laws of this State, a divorce so
obtained shall have no force or effect in this State."
Pursuant to this case, because the Defendant, Mrs.
Wiedbusch (Baker), unlawfully filed in a foreign forum, the
rights of the Plaintiff, Mr. Wiedbusch (Staker) as to the
Page 34 - Brief of Appeallant

discovery of the minor child, was not upheldu

Visitation of

said minor child was not so ordered, because the Complaint that
was served upon Mr. Wiedbusch (Staker) expressly stated, "That
there have been no children born of this marriage."

That the

Defendant, by fraud upon the Court tried to hide the existance
of the unborn minor child.

That the Defendant is a known drug

addict, in that area, that said minor child, was given no
protection from the effects of the Defendants' uncontrolled drug
usage durning pregnancy.
That the Plaintiff was never notified of the existance of
said minor child, by the Defendant or the foreign Court, that
eight months after the Default Hearing, the State of Idaho,
Department of Health and Welfare, sent a letter, asking why he
was four months behind on his child support.
That on July 19, 1987, three days after receiving the Idaho
letter, the State of Idaho and the Defendant, Mrs, Wiedbusch
(Baker) filed suit against the Plaintiff for the non-payment of
child support.

Asking for Utah to seize the Plaintiffs' assets,

and to garnish his wages. The Plaintiff had not received any
Orders to pav child support, or notice that a child existed.
On December 21, 1987, the State of Idaho and the Defendant,
Mrs. Wiedbusch (Baker), again filed suit against the Plaintiff,
Mr. Wiedbusch (Staker) for the willfull non-payment of child
support, and sent said Order to Utah for enforcement, that said
offense is a Third Degree Felony.

That Idaho based all action, upon the fraudulent Idaho
Decree, and has not submitted any evidence to the validity of
their claim against the Plaintiff.
That the Defendant, Mrs, Wiedbusch, has now submitted to
the Idaho Court, that she was guilty of adulery, that she had
broken the marital vows, to such a degree that she did not know
who the Father was of the minor child, but it was not the
Plaintiff.

Petition for the termination of the Parental Rights

of R. Troy Wiedbusch (Staker), May 25, 1983.
That the Plaintiff has been dragged though one and half
years of mental duress, not knowing if a minor child existed,
not knowing where the minor child is, knowing that the Defendant
is a known drug addict, and could be living in drug flophouse,
as she has in the past, that she could be selling the minor
child sexually, in an attempt to acquire drugs, that she could
be ir> jail, and minor child is in a foster home.
That all of this is a direct result of the Defendant,
abandoning the homestead, in Utah, and attempting to escape
Utahs' tough divorce laws, and running to a friendly foreign
forum, and securing a divorce by fraud on the court as to
residence and domicil.
That it is the right of every

person to be secure and

protected from fear, intimidation, harassment, and harm caused
by the activities of groups and individuals,
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CONCLUSION ON ISSUE B
1, That a citizen of one State can not go into a
sister-State and there obtain a decree of Divorce for a cause
arising out of the first State.
US SUPREME COURT 181 US 1^6
"When a inhabitant of this State goes into another State or
Country to obtain a divorce for any cause occuring here, and
whilst the parties resided here, or for any cause which would
not authorize a divorce by the laws of this State, a divorce
so
obtained shall have no force or effect in the State."
2,

That the rights of the remaining spouse can not be

upheld by the granting of "Good-Faith" to the Decree of Divorce
obtain by the other by fraud on the Court,
US SUPREME COURT 317 US 237
" , ,,It nullifies the power of each state to protect its own
citizens against the dissolution of their marriage by the courts
oi other states which have an easier system of divorce, in which
neither party has ever lived, and there commence proceedings
without personal service of process. The spouse remaining
within the state of domicile need n^y^r know of the proceedings.
Or, if it copies to ones' knowledge, the choice is between
equal 1y useless alternatives."
3.

It is the right of each and e^ery citizen to feel

secure and protected. Constitution of Utah.
4.

That b' the upholding of a foreign T&cree

which was

obtained bv fraud on the Court, and to escape the hard divorce
laws of this State, is not upholding the rights of the citizens
who did not flea to a foreign State to acquire a Decree.
Therefore to uphold the Plaintiffs* rights this Idaho
Decree of Divorce must be impeached.

SUMMARY ON ISSUE C
That the dismissal of the case, with the issue of the
validity of the Idaho 'Decree in the pleadings of the case, and
then to based this dismissal on the Idaho Decree and no
compelling evidence, does not allow ior
grievances.

That is the very

a proper redress oi

reason that Discovery as outlined

in the Utah Court Rules, as set down by Law, in Utah Title 73,
annotated 1953, as admended, this exist to allow each party
a wa* to obtain evidence to show that the pleadings in the case
Rre either true and the action requested thereby Ordered, or to
show that the pleadings in the case are false at^d the action
requested der^ led.
That the Defendant by and though her counsel of record,
acknowledge the validity of the Discovery document, entitled
"PLAINTIFFS' FIRST REQUEST FOR THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS",
March 16, 1«38, in their "MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER", April
21, 19S8.

That the Trail Court does not have the right to

dismiss a case, in the middle of discovery, on the bases of the
'''Good-Faith" of a document that the pleadings of the complaint
specificall/ states was acquired by fraud, and one of the
Plaintiffs' redress by said complaint is to show the fraud of
said document, and impeachment of the document.
DETAILS OF THE ARGUMENT ON ISSUE C
That ar) March 16, 1938, the Plaintiffin accordance with the
Rules of Civil Procedure, served upon the Defendant by and though
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her counsel, with a document of discovery, to which <.ne allowed
thirty days has past, and no attempt by Defendant or Counsel has
been made to comply.
That the Trial Court two days later, dismiss said
complaint, on "...The absence of compelling evidence.. . ".
That the Plaintiff then submitted his Motion for Review, in
which he points out that the Trial Court dismissed said action,
when the Defendant produced no evidence except the void decree,
and the Plaintiff produced as evidence against the Idaho Decree
seven case rulings, four Utah laws, and two affidavits prior to
the dismissing of the case.
The Trail Court upheld its decision to dismiss this
Complaint, on "...Mo compelling evidence..." in its memorandum
decision, in contrary to what the US Supreme Court ruled:
"The only evidence upon this point was in an affidavit...
The evidence is meagre and not entirely satisfactory and
conclusive, IT WAS'HOWEVER, UNCONTRADICTED." Tilt v. Kelsey,
20? US 53,
That to base the dismissal upon the Idaho Decree, is
contrary to what the US Supreme Court ruled:
"Process from the tribunals of one State cannot run into
another State, and summon parties there domiciled to leave its
territory and respond to proceedings against them. Publication
of process or notice within the State where the tribunal sits
cannot create any greater obligation upon the non-resident to
appear. Process sent to him out of the State, and process
published within it, are equally unavailing in proceedings to
establish his personal lability." Haddock v. Haddock 201 US 562.
"It is enough to say (of this proceeding) that it was
wholly without jurisdiction of the person, and whatever validity
it may have in England, (Idaho) by virtue of statute law against

property of the defendant there situate, it can have no validity
here, even of a PRIMA FACIE character. It is simply null,"
Bishoff v. Wethered, 9 Wall 812.
The Plaintiff had in a preivous brief submitted to the
Trial Court the US Supreme Court ruling of Williams vs. North
Carolina, 325 US 226, where the US Supreme Court made the
foil owi ng j udgmen t;
"Thp -full faith and credit clause does not make a
sister-state judgment a judgment in another state, but to give
it that effect, it must be made a judgment there, which can be
done onl^' if the court purporting to render the orginal judgment
had power to pas on the merits,"
The Trial Court in its Memorandum decision dismissed said
case because, the Honorable Scott Daniels felt that a another
Court could not determine if the jurisdictional -fact hB,d been
met.

The Trial Court then backed his decision with Williams v.

North Carolina, 325 US 226, but said US Supreme Court stated the
following in this case, under Judgment 370 Section 370 - Divorce
- Refusal to accord

full faith and credit:

"A judgment refusing to accord full faith and credit to the
divorce decree of a sister state on the ground that no bona fide
domicil was acquired there will not be upset by the United
States Supreme Court if this court finds that proper weight was
gi /en to the claims of power by the court of the sister state?
that the burden of disproving the domicil there was proper 1/
charged against the party challenging the validity of the
divorce decree; that such issue of fact was left for fair
determination by appropriate procedure; and that a finding as to
absence of domicil in the sister state is amply supported in
evidence. . . *'
That the evidence might not have been amply, but it however
was uncontested.
Th^t -fraud as to domicile and residence voids and/or
nullifies decree.
Page 40 - Brief of Appeal 1 ant

Watson v. Watson, 270 S.E.2d 257; 49 N.C. App 58; In re
Carters' Estate, 331 N.Y.S.2d 257, 69 Misc. 2d 630; Cole v.
Cole, Const, art, 4:1, cl 1, 23 U.S.C.A.: 1738 Id.J Day v. Day
205 A.2d 798; Winters v. Winters, Ar J'Stats: : 34-1208, 34-1208-1,
111 So.2d 418; Weiier • . Weiier, 331 S.W.2d 165; Aspromonte v.
Aspromonte, 164 N.V.S.2d 29^; Alabama Comment, Code Ala.1940,
Tit.34:;27,29, U.S.C.Ac Const, art 4:1, --Id.J Donne!1 v.
Howell, Code Ala.1*40, Tit.34::27,29, U.S.C.A. Const, art
4:liC.J.S. Divorce 169c; Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906,
ref. n. r. e, ; Muroma v. Muiwna, 194 P. 2d 24, 36 C.A.2d 133;
Galloway v. Galloway, 2 P.2d 842, 116 C.A. 133.

That if it can be shown that the Defendant did not
live there Six Weeks prior which the Decree shows, that the
Decree should have been impeached.

In re James' Estate, 33 P. 1122, 99 C. 374. 3"? Am.St.R. 60;
Hammond v, Hammond, I.C.:32-701:RCW 26.08.21, 45 Wash.2d 855;
Delanoy v. Delanoy, 13 P.2d 719, 216 C. 27, 86 A.L.R. 1321; In
re Pauls* Estate, 1~>5 P.2d 284, *?7 C,A,2d 5"?9} Rehearing denied,
102 P.2d 545, 38 C.A.2d 579; Concurrinq - Id; Stewart v.
Stewart, 89 P,2d 404, 32 C.A.2d 148 5 Kegle/ v. Kegle/, 60 P,2d
404, 32 C.A.2d 216; R/der v. Ryder, 3"? P.2d 482, 16 C.A.2d 426;
Wampler v. Wampler, U.S.C.A. Const. 4:1, 170 P,2d 316, 25
Wash.2d 258? Ex parte Medbury, 73 P.2d 1340, 192 Wash. 462.
CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE C
1.

That the Trial Court was out o-f line, in dismiss said

complaint on the Idaho Decree of Divorce and denying Discovery,
that said Decree of Divorce was not made a judgment here, and
the Court had evidence to suggest that said Decree was acquired
by fraud on the Court and said Idaho Court did not have the
jurisdiction needed to render
dismissing said complaint.

a valid decreet

and was wrong in

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE D
That Peter W. Guyon is in fact representing a unknown third
party.

That Peter W, Guyon, confessed that he did not know

where the Defendant really was, stating that he thinks, she is
somewhere in Idaho,
That the Trial Court on February 12, 1988 found that the
Defendant had indeed ran away, and disappeared, in which she did
not leave a forwarding address.

That this Order has not been

put aside, that the Defendant has not made any appearance, the
Defendant has not answered anv of the allegation that was before
the Trial Court, that said day for the submitting of the answers
was the 12th day of March, 1988, and yet she has not answered
them to date, the Defendant has not refuted any of the
allegations made against her, the Defendant has not submitted
any affidavit whatsoever, the Defendant has not participated in
Discovery, nor has made any attempt to justify not participating.
That the Plaintiff has alleged that Peter W. Guyon was
representing a unknown third party in his MOTION FOR REVIEW, and
brief, on April 1, 1988, that Peter W. Guyon has not since that
time been able to acquire any proof whatsoever that he is the
Defendants' at tornev.
That Peter W. Guyon has had plenty of time, and has not in
anyway refuted the truthfu11ness of him representing a third
party,
DETAILS ON ARGUMENT ON ISSUE D
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That the Defendant was fond to have disappeared on February
12, 1988, by the Trial Court,
That Peter W. Guyon made a appearance twenty three days
after the disappearance of the Defendant.
On March 18, 1988 after the Court Hearing, that Peter W.
Guyon told the undersign that he did not really know where the
defendant was,
That it has been allged by the Plaintiff that Mr. Guyon is
representing a third party, since April 1, 1988 in which Mr,
Guvon has not been able to subrnitt anv evidence from his client
to show otherwise,
That the Defendant is unemployed and receives $200,00 per
month from welfare, that if Mr, Guyon is her attorney, has two
attorneys who fight each other.
That oti May 25, 1988, the Defendant filed suit on issues
pending here, in complete ignorance to the proceedings here,
CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE D
1.

Based on the evidence that is before this Court, Peter

W. Guyon is in fact representing a unknown third party.
2.

That in pursuant to the undisputed Court Order, the

Defendant did in fact disappear, Bn6 has not made a appearance,
3.

That Peter W. Guyon is representing a third party, and

himself in a personal fight with the Plaintiff, who was a
hostile witness in the divorce proceedings of his family.
4.

That the Defendant was a known drug addict, and was

Pacxe* 4 ^ - Brief

of

AoDeallant

trafficing drugs into Salt Lake City, Utah for Dr. Waldon E,
Isom, of Ontario Oregan, and that the Defendant used the
marriage

as a front for said operations, and fled when this

operation was discovered.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE E
That Peter W. Guyon could not have represented the Defendant
for he was the Plaintiffs' family attorney, in which he was
representing the Plaintiffs' step-father.

That as the familys'

counsel, it was a violation of his attorney-client relationship.
That Peter W. Guyon be disiplined for not recusing himself, when
he was served the MOTION TO DISMISS PETEP W. GUYON, on March ?,
198S the day he made a appearance.
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE E
That Peter W. Guyon is the Plaintiffs' family attorney and
as such has access to sentitive personal reports on the
Plaintiff, that another attorney would not have.

And that his

representing the Defendant is a direct conflict of interest.
CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE E
1.

That Peter W. Guyon is currently the counsel of

record

in a legal conflict that started when the Plaintiff was a minor
child, and will be resolved in 1994.
2.

That as such he has a personal knowledge of the

Plaintiff and has access to psychological report and other
sentitive information that was acquired on the Plaintiff as a
mi nor child.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE F
That a fair hearing could not have been given to the
Plaintiff, by the Defendants' counsel, Peter W. Guyon,
misrepresenting things to the Trial Court, on offical purposed
Court Orders.

That said misrepresentations stayed with the

Trial Court, and that the Plaintiff did not obtain a fair
hearing with the Defendants' counsel perjuring to the Court.
That Peter W. Guyon be displined for making misrepresentations
to the Trial Court.
DETAILS OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE F
That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court, a MEMORANDUM OF
PLAINTIFF IN OPPOSITION TO

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

UNDER RULE 11, that in this document, the Plaintiff points out
14 such misrepresentsions, impling a false impression to the
Trial Court, on such things as Motions, Orders.
That one of such misrepresentations the adding of the
"Good-Faith Clause" to a purposed Order was the sole argument
that the Trial Court uphelds its decision to dismiss.
CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE F
1.

That this is not a trivial matter, this is called

perjury, and because of Peter W. Guyon doing this, it cost the
Plaintiff a fair hearing.
2.

That Mr. Guyon has been aware of this, and has not

refuted the truthfu11ness to date or has stopped it, but still
seeks to confuse the issues.

SUMMARY OH ISSUE G
That the Trial Court did not accurately uphold existing
Utah Law, when it without making the necessary findings, denied
four counts of Rule 11 sanctions, against the Defendant,, when
her counsel Peter W, Guyon submitted Motions in which each issue
was already before the Trial Court, and set for Hearing.

That

the Plaintiff should be award sanction equal to the sanction
that was awarded to Peter W. Guyon, that of $150.00 for each
of the four times,
DETAILS OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE G
That Peter W. Guyon, in the behalf of the Defendant
submitted a Motion to Dissmiss, on which every issue was before
the Trial Court, and set for hearing. That he has futher filed a
Motion for Order of contempt and entry oi
every issue was before the Court.

judgment, on which

And he futher submitted a

Motion *nd Order in Supplemental proceedings, on which

every

issue was already before the Court, And he submitted a Order in
Supplemental proceedings, ordering the Plaintiff into Court
which was served on him the day before the set hearing, and
evsry

issue was already before e the Court,
CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE G
1.

That in each case the Trail Court refused to grant

Rule 11 sanction, even thou the Motions and Order served no
purpose and was solel/ for harassment, that this was pointed out,
and no evidence was submitted to show otherwise^ that on the last
Motion and Order, they defaulted and didn't even show up,
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE H
That the Trial Court on April 1, 1988 awarded sanction
against the Plaintiff when it so Ordered the Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss and far Attorneys' fees and cost, March 29, 1988.
That said Motion was mailed to the Plaintiff on said day, and
pursuant to Rule 5(e) was legally served upon the Plaintiff on
the very

day of the 1st day of April, 1988 but after the hearing.

That a partv can not submitt a Motion to the Court and have
the Court award said Motion, before the opposing party, in this
case the Plaintiff has not legally received it.

That this is

not in accordance with the Rule of Civil Procedure, as contained
in the Utah Court Rule, 1953 annotated, as amended.

That the

Trial Court was out of line in awarding said sanction.

That

said sanction was based in the Memorandum Decision, April 29,
1988 Honorable Scott Daniels on the lack of familarity of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, that this is a vaque argument, that
can neither be proven or disproven, that the Trial Court did not
back said argument up with any facts or findings, that it was a
punishment for being poor and not being able to afford ari
attor ney,
DETAILS OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE H
That the Motion to Dismiss and for Attorneys' fees and
Cost,

was submitted to the Court on March 29, 1998.

notice was submitted to hear said Motion.

That no

That Mr. Guyon

illegally and against Rule 5(e) Rules of Civil Procedure brought
said Motion up three days later.

that the Court overruled the

Plaintiffs* pleas and Ordered the same against him.

That in the Motion for Order of Contempt and *or entry of
Judgment, April

IS, 1988, Mr. Guyon shows the real reason why

the Trial Court granted sanctions, which was because the
Plaintiff was representing himself PRO SE and was to poor to
have ^fi

attorney.

CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE H
1.

That the Motion to dismiss and for Attorneys' fees and

cost was illegally brough before the Trial Court, and the Trial
Court was in error to grant said sanctions.
2.

"*hat the sanctions were r>ot awarded irs pursuant to

Rule li5 but was a punishment against the Plaintiff for being
desti K»ed .
SUMMARY ON ARGUMENT ON ISSUE I
That the Trial Court did in fact slander the interity of
the Plaintiff, when he move the court for payments of 515.00
each due to his destitution.

And the Trial Court put into its

MEMORANDUM DECISION, that the Plaintiff

in asking for payments

BELIEVES that because he is poor, that the Defendant
made to bear the cost of his decision
PERSONA.

to proceed

should.be

PROPRIA

That this is not the case and this MEMORANDUM DECISION

should be put aside,
CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE I
That the Trial Court awarded sanctions against the
Plaintiff, because he did not have a attorney and was detitued.
That the Plaintiff

in an effort to uphold his obligations asked

for payments, to which the Court in its Memorandum Decision
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stated that the Plaintiff feels that the Defendant should pay
hi s way.
CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE I
1.

That the Trial Court did in fact slander the Plaintiff

actionable psr se.
2.

That the Trail Court did not give the Plaintiff a fair-

hear i ng.
3.

That the Trial Court did not uphold the Plaintiffs'

rights to Equal Protection and Treatment under the law.
CONCLUSION
That the Plaintiff did not receive a fair Hearing in
accordance with the existing laws of the State of Utah,

That

the Plaintiffs' rights as to Equal Protection and Treatment was
also denied,

That the 30 days for the answering of the

Complaint has passed, and no answer has been issued, and must be
construed as Default.

in

That the Defendant has not cooperated

Discovery, and Peter W, Guvon is at a loss as to how to obtain
any information from the Defendant.

That the evidence presented

to this Court by the Plaintiffs' affidavits is meagre and not
entirely satisfactory, but IT WAS HOWEVER, UNCONTRADICTED.

That

the time to present evidence is over, and in the interest of
Justice the Plaintiff prays as follows:
1) That the Memorandum Decision and other unsigned Orders
of March 13, 1988 and April 1, 1^83 be reversed, 2) that the
Complaint for Divorce be not dismissed, 3) that the Idaho Decree
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be found lacking the jurisdictional fact and be impeached, 4)
that a determination be made if Peter W, Guyon is or is not the
counsel of Defendant, 5) that if Peter W. Guyon is not the
Defendants' counsel that all papers' submitted by him be
striken, 6)

that if Peter W. Guyon is the Defendants' counsel

that he be removed, and disiplined for conflict of interest, 7)
that Peter W. Guyon be recommended for suspension for making
misrepresentations to the Trial Court, 8) that four counts oi
sanctions be awarded to the Plaintiff for Defendants' or Peter
W. Guyons* violations of Rule 11 in the amount of $150,00 per
violation, 9) that the judgment of $150.00 awarded as a
punishment against the Plaintiff be reversed, 10) that the
legality of this matter be brought to the Trial Court, 11) that
the Plaintiff receives damages in the amount of $3,00 per

page

of this brief, $125.00 filing fee, $25.00 transfer fee, and
whatever the Court feels should be awarded.
DATED this the

t>

day of August, 1988.

*

^^^fc^^fTlR. Tr^rHaJkaker,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e a l l a n t *

R. Troy Staker
208 South Main tt 38
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: 562-2568
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF THE BRIEF OF APPEALLANT
August 5, 1988.
I, R. Troy Staker, hereby certifies that on the date of August
5, 1988, I did go to the office of Peter W. Guyon, located at
614 Newhouse, 10 Exchange Place, in Salt Lake City, Utah and did
deliver to him, or a person authorized to accept delivery of
this service, four true and correct copies of the offical Brief
of Appeallant, that is filed on this date, in the Court of
Appeals.
DATED this the 5th day of August, 1988.

^--/sio^J^i^Lc^
R. Troy Staker
I, Peter W. Guyon, or a person authorized to accept service in
ard for the behalf of him do hereby certify that I received the
above stated document.
DATED this the 5th day of August, 1988.

